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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Transparency, Risk, and Managerial Actions 
 
By 
 
Gwendolyn Perkins Pennywell 
 
May 15, 2009 
 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Jayant R. Kale 
 
Major Department: Finance 
 
 
 I investigate the relation between firm risk and firm transparency over the period 1992-
2006 and find that the level of firm transparency and the level of firm risk are negatively related. 
I also find that higher CEO pay-performance sensitivity (delta) works to mitigate this inverse 
relationship. This result is consistent with Hermalin and Weisbach (2007) who suggest that 
managers reduce risk to protect their pay and performance evaluations under higher levels of 
firm transparency. I further find that firms in high technology industries are more likely to 
increase risk relative to firms in other industries when transparency is high. Finally, I develop an 
additional proxy for transparency based on the Standard and Poor’s Transparency and Disclosure 
Score. Results using this proxy are generally consistent with my findings that there is an inverse 
relationship between risk and transparency and that CEO pay-performance sensitivity lessens 
this relationship. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Recent laws indicate that regulators believe that transparency is beneficial because it acts 
as a mechanism to discipline the manager and keep him honest.  For example, the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (SOX) was originally argued for on the grounds that it would increase managerial 
accountability through corporate transparency.
1
  While there are theoretical models that explore 
the relationship between firm transparency and managerial actions, empirical evidence is sparse.  
Much of the empirical attention focuses on other benefits of transparency and typically weighs 
them against the commonly addressed costs of transparency which include the direct costs of 
disclosure, and the costs of releasing useful information to product-market rivals.
2
  I define 
―Transparency‖ as the ability of outsiders to determine the cash flows of a publicly traded 
company.  This definition is in the spirit of Ang and Ciccone’s (2003) definition which is ―more 
easily understood financially.‖ Thus, while transparency involves providing information to 
reflect a comprehensive picture of the firm’s financial performance, it need not mandate that the 
firm should release information that may negate its competitive advantage.  
In this study, I explore the relation between transparency and managerial decisions.  I 
provide empirical evidence of a strong causal relation between the level of transparency in the 
firm and the level of risk taken by the manager. Specifically I find that higher levels of 
transparency are associated with lower levels of risk. Thus, transparency may not necessarily 
―discipline‖ the manager, but it does work to make him more cautious.  Furthermore, I show that 
the manager’s compensation package impacts this relationship. Holding the level of transparency 
constant and increasing the pay-performance sensitivity of the CEO lead to a reduction in firm 
                                               
1 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was originally referred to as the "Corporate and Auditing Accountability, Responsibility, 
and Transparency Act" or "CAARTA" when put before the House of Representatives on April 25, 2002. 
2 Leuz and Wysocki (2006) provide a survey of recent disclosure literature. 
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risk. This evidence supports the importance of managerial career concerns and is consistent with 
the model derived by Hermalin and Weisbach (2007). 
I also test importance of non-manager career concerns, via the effect of human capital 
costs, on the relation between the manager’s choice of risk and the level of firm transparency.  
Almazan, Suarez, and Titman (2004) suggest that higher levels of transparency should be linked 
with lower levels of risk to protect the level of the reservation wage paid to employees.  Their 
suggestion is based on the premise that employees require higher compensation to remain at 
companies associated with bad news.  Transparency makes it difficult for the firm to curtail bad 
news so firms reduce risk to minimize the probability that such news will be bad.  If true, the 
negative relationship should be strongest for firms with the highest human capital costs.   
I use technology to proxy for human capital costs.  The level of technology is based on 
the firm’s three-digit SIC code and the characterization of high technology follows Kwon (2002).  
High technology industries should have the lowest levels of risk according to Almazan, Suarez, 
and Titman (2004).  I find that firms in high technology industries actually choose higher levels 
of firm risk relative to firms in industries with lower technology levels when transparency is held 
constant.  This result is consistent with firms exploiting the benefits of transparency.  For 
example, transparency reduces the cost of capital.  Since human capital is more difficult to value, 
than fixed assets, high technology firms should benefit most from the reduction in cost of capital.   
As a result, they have a higher capacity for increasing risk before negating the benefits derived 
from transparency. 
Finally, I analyze the viability of using firm characteristics to design a model that predicts 
the Transparency and Disclosure Score (T&D Score) developed by Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 
in 2001. I predict this score because S&P published their T&D Score for only one year and only 
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for the five hundred firms they tracked. I then use my predictive model to generate a Predicted 
T&D Score for all firms and all years (1992-2006) in my sample. Since the scores are whole 
numbers ranging from one to ten, I transform the score using the natural log to create a variable 
with more continuous properties. Consistent with my other measures of transparency, I find a 
negative relationship between the Predicted T&D Score and Risk.  While not as significant, I 
continue to find evidence that the compensation package of the manager can lessen this 
relationship.  However, the correlation between my proxy and the other proxies for transparency 
is thirty percent at its highest.   
The rest of this study is organized into seven sections. Section 2 presents a brief literature 
review and a discussion of the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample and variables used. 
Section 4 provides detailed results of the relation between Transparency and Risk as well as 
explains the econometric method used to deal with endogeneity. Section 5 presents the results of 
the explanations of the relationship between Risk and Transparency based on career concerns for 
managers and non-managers. Section 6 examines the model that predicts T&D Scores and 
discusses the results.  Section 7 summarizes my conclusions. 
2. Literature review, hypothesis, and contribution 
2.1 Previous Literature 
Most existing work on transparency focuses on its various benefits. For example, 
Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989) and Ang and Brau (2002) find that transparency reduces 
asymmetric information. Verrecchia (1990), Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) and Botosan and 
Plumlee (2002) find that transparency reduces cost of capital. Datar, Naik, and Radcliffe (1998) 
find that transparency increases liquidity. In these studies, the benefits from transparency arise 
naturally and are not based on specific managerial actions such as project choices, perquisite 
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consumption, etc.  My study differs from these studies since I focus on how transparency 
influences managerial decisions. Particularly, I am interested in how transparency impacts the 
risk decisions of the manager. 
There are models and arguments that suggest that the benefits of transparency arise from 
its impact on managerial behavior.  For example, the premise of SOX is that transparency limits 
the manager’s incentive to ―misbehave.‖  This argument does not predict a specific direction in 
the relationship between risk and transparency. For example, if the manager is behaving 
appropriately, there is no expectation of an adjustment in risk if the level firm transparency 
increases.  However, if the manager is not acting in the best interest of the shareholder and 
chooses too much risk (too little risk); transparency will give him the incentive to reduce 
(increase) the level of risk in the firm.   
Another example that focuses on managerial behavior is John, Litov, and Yeung (2008). 
They model transparency as an incentive alignment mechanism. In their model, the manager 
must make two decisions: the amount of managerial perquisites (perks) to consume and the 
amount of risk to take in investment decisions. Since the perks are, as the authors explain, 
―skimmed off the top,‖ they are similar to holding a priority claim on the company’s cash flow. 
This implicit claim effectively aligns the manager’s incentives with those of the debt holders. As 
a result, it provides incentives for the manager to forego risky investments that would be value 
enhancing to the shareholders. Instead the manager would accept less risky projects that would 
protect the fixed payments due to the bondholders.  
Increased investor protection, via government laws that protect shareholder rights and/or 
strong governance mechanisms through board construction, increases the expected costs of perk 
consumption and results in the manager choosing a lower level of those perks. The authors 
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equate this to reducing the manager’s ―senior debt,‖ which in turn diminishes his sub-optimal 
conservatism and measure transparency in the context of corporate governance. Thus, they 
model investor protection as the alignment mechanism. John and Litov’s (2005) study implies 
that risk should be positively correlated with transparency as measured by investor protection. 
Empirically, they find support for this argument. However, it should be noted that their study 
looks across countries and not at individual firms. 
 Almazan, Suarez and Titman (2004) also model the importance of transparency on 
managerial decisions. However, their study is not based on incentive alignment, but on the 
importance of human capital costs. In their model, the inverse relationship between risk and 
transparency is driven by the notion that employees derive non-monetary benefits such as 
training, quality experience, and prestige by working for strong companies. Poor performance 
would decrease the value of these benefits leading to higher costs of retaining workers through 
higher compensatory wages.  The theory of risk aversion is heavily influenced by the costs of 
retaining workers, which is associated with the difficulty of replacing an employee with an 
employee of equivalent or higher ability. These costs are highest when the firm relies heavily on 
employees’ expertise, experience, and/or intellectual properties.  
Almazan, Suarez and Titman (2004) further explain that employees are more concerned 
with bad news than good news. They respond to bad news by increasing their reservation wage. 
However, good news is not associated with a corresponding reduction in the reservation wage. 
Consequently, on average it is in the firm’s best interest to limit the amount of news. An 
alternative to limiting the amount of news is limiting the probability that any released news will 
be bad. This can be done by making conservative decisions. Since higher transparency means 
more revelations and reducing risk decreases the probability of a negative state.  It is in the 
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firm’s/manager’s best interest to reduce risk under increased transparency. All else equal, this 
model predicts an inverse relationship between risk and transparency.   
2.2 Hypotheses 
John, Litov, and Yeung (2008) predict a positive relationship between risk and 
transparency; on the other hand, Almazan, Suarez, and Titman predict a negative relationship 
between risk and transparency.  Thus, as a first step in my study, I test the hypothesis that there is 
a relationship between risk and transparency. According to these studies, there is support for the 
relationship to go in either direction. Additionally, these predictions of the relationships are not 
mutually exclusive.   
However, these models do not account for the difference in risk tolerance between the 
shareholders and the managers when firms are transparent.  Amihud and Lev (1981) propose that 
a difference in risk preferences exists between managers and shareholders.  The preferences are 
different because managers have reason to be more risk averse at the firm level than 
shareholders.  This difference is driven by the fact that shareholders can diversify and manage 
risk at the portfolio level in the stock market, but the manager is limited to controlling his human 
capital risk at the firm level. The manager’s lack of diversification options leads to a higher 
aversion to firm risk than that of the shareholders. As the primary decision maker for the firm, 
aversion could lead the manager to make personally biased corporate decisions that differ from 
decisions shareholders would prefer he make.  We must then ask if this difference in risk 
preference has any bearing on the level of firm risk the manager is willing to take under 
increased transparency. Current literature suggests that it does.  
One such study is by Hermalin and Weisbach (2007) who argue that managerial 
incentives are a factor in the relationship between risk and transparency. Hermalin and Weisbach 
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(2007) argue that increased transparency can impose costs on the firm in the form of higher 
executive compensation. In their model, the manager’s compensation is based on the public 
perception of his ability. This perception is derived from the weighted average of the prior 
estimate of his ability and the signal provided by the firm’s performance. The prior estimate is 
fixed while the performance-based signal is random. Since the manager is risk averse, he prefers 
that more weight be placed on the fixed component when the signal is noisier.  
The CEO prefers a noisier signal since this forces a heavier weight to be placed on the 
prior estimate. However, a more transparent firm reduces the noisiness of the signal, resulting in 
more weight being placed on the random signal making the risk averse CEO worse off. As a 
result, he requires higher compensation to offset the increased uncertainty driven by the random 
signal. Hermalin and Weisbach (2007) further argue that in the absence of a change in the 
compensation package, the manager may elect to reduce firm risk to help minimize the noise of 
the random signal.  
Moreover, previous studies have analyzed the relationship between compensation and 
risk. For example, Jensen and Meckling (1976), Guay (1999), Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006), 
and others have argued that convex compensation schemes can provide incentives for managers 
to take on risky projects.
3
 Based on these studies, I expect that higher compensation should work 
to mitigate the relationship between risk and transparency. This mitigation is because the 
expectation of higher performance based pay works in the opposite direction of job security 
concerns under increased transparency.       
 While no theoretical model exists, intuition and various empirical studies support the 
argument that the manager (who maximizes his utility) may have career incentives to increase 
risk in transparent firms. Fee and Hadlock (2002) find that increased performance leads to a good 
                                               
3 See Fields and Keys (2003) for a brief survey. 
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reputation and increased human capital value as evidenced by the connection between good 
performance and voluntary CEO job changes. These changes are linked to higher pay and large 
signing bonuses.   
Since increased transparency provides the market and shareholders with a clearer picture 
of the firm’s performance and cash flows, a manager may have incentive to invest in risky 
positive NPV projects he would otherwise forgo in an effort to maximize firm performance and 
by extension his human capital value. When the firm is transparent, the argument follows from 
the idea that the market is in a better position to more accurately evaluate the performance and 
risk of the projects and will not penalize the manager for bad performance which is beyond his 
control. This is consistent with studies such as Warner, Watts, and Wruck (1988), Morck, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1989), and Barro and Barro (1990). Additionally, Gibbons and Murphy 
(1990) find evidence that both market-wide shocks and industry shocks are filtered from stock 
price performance for the CEO’s dismissal decision. These studies infer that transparency would 
lower the probability that a bad outcome due to the riskiness of the project would be attributed to 
poor managerial ability, especially if the shareholders approved the project before initiation.  
Thus, these studies support the conclusion that managers have incentives to increase risk in 
transparent firms in an effort to maximize their career potential. 
My second hypothesis tests whether the manager’s risk tolerance impacts the relationship 
between risk and transparency.  Hermalin and Weisbach (2007) suggest that transparency leads 
to increased compensation costs due to managerial risk aversion.  Alternatively, transparency 
could induce the manager to accept riskier projects if he is confident that he will not bear the cost 
of risks that should be attributed to the project. 
  16 
The third hypothesis is based on the importance non-managerial career concerns and is 
driven by the retention costs of qualified workers. As previously outlined in Almazan, Suarez, 
and Titman’s (2004) argument, the benefits of minimizing reservation wages are highest when 
those costs are substantial. Examples would be industries in which the competition for skilled 
workers is considerably strong. In such cases, the firm has incentive to hold on to skilled 
employees. One method could be by reducing the probability of negative news being released 
since this news could scare off frighten away current workers and make it more difficult to 
attract new ones. Increased transparency makes it more difficult to contain such negative 
information. As a result, the firm may reduce the probability of negative news being released by 
reducing firm risk. This leads to the expectation that industries with the highest retention costs 
should reduce risk under high levels of transparency. Thus, I expect the negative relationship 
should be strongest for these industries. 
2.3 Contributions to the literature  
There are two empirical studies that examine the relationship between risk and 
transparency at the firm level. First, Ciccone (2003) models the determinants of transparency and 
finds that transparency, as measured by the dispersion of analysts’ earning forecasts, is correlated 
with lower risk. Risk is measured using the firm’s beta. However, his study does not control for 
potential endogeneity issues or address causality. Secondly, Cheng, Collins, and Huang (2003) 
find that stronger corporate governance, as measured by S&P Transparency and disclosure 
rankings, reduces firm risk as measured by beta. Unfortunately, the S&P Transparency and 
Disclosure rankings are only available for 2001 and are limited to the 500 firms followed by 
Standard and Poor’s. These studies show that there is a relationship between risk and 
transparency, but does not explore reasons for this relationship. 
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I add to the literature in that I econometrically address the limitations of the previous 
studies by controlling for endogeneity and I also show causality.  I attempt to expand the utility 
of the S&P Transparency and Disclosure Score with a similar predicted score that covers all 
firms in Compustat from 1992-2006. Consistent with Ciccone (2003) and Cheng et al., I find a 
negative relationship between firm risk and firm transparency using both traditional and my 
newly created proxy for transparency.  
I further explore reasons for the negative relationship between risk and transparency.  I 
analyze the importance of career concern from two perspectives—managerial compensation and 
the cost of retaining other valuable employees.  I interact delta with my measures of transparency 
to test the effect of managerial compensation and find that the interaction mitigates the negative 
relationship between risk and transparency.  I also interact an HT dummy
4
 with my measures of 
transparency to test the effect of human capital costs.  I find mixed result for the human capital 
cost argument.  
3. Data sources, variable construction, and sample description 
 
3.1 Data Sources 
 The primary data sources for this study include the Institutional Brokers' Estimate System 
(IBES), the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)/Compustat merged, and ExecuComp.   
Sample period is from 1992 to 2006. All analyst information is obtained from IBES and includes 
mean annual earnings per share (EPS) forecasts, actual annual EPS, and standard deviations for 
these measures. Compensation data pertain to the active CEO for the relevant year as identified 
by ExecuComp. Firm characteristics are obtained from the CRSP/Compustat merged database 
through WRDS.  
3.2 Measures of Transparency  
                                               
4 HT Dummy is a Dummy variable set to one for firms in high tech industries as identified by Kwon (2002) and zero otherwise. 
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   The first proxy for transparency is a measure of information asymmetry that is based on 
the extent of disagreement in analysts’ earnings forecasts. Krishnaswami and Subramaniam 
(1999), argue that this measure captures the analysts’ inability to understand the firm. I measure 
this level of asymmetry (dispersion) as the standard deviation of a firm’s earnings per share 
estimates (EPSi) as of the last reporting month prior to the release of the actual earnings per 
share, normalized by the firm’s share price.  The variable DISPERSE is then defined as follows;  
 
where N is the number of reporting analysts, EPSi is the actual earnings per share for the i
th
 firm, 
and EPS FOR is the last average earnings per share released prior to the release of the actual 
earnings. As defined, DISPERSE is positively correlated with informational asymmetry or 
opaqueness.  To capture Transparency, I use the negative value of DISPERSE: 
Analyst Dispersion = — DISPERSE 
Although several other studies also use analyst dispersion as a proxy for information risk, 
some argue that this measure merely captures differences of opinion among analysts. For 
example, all analysts could have incorrect, overly optimistic views of a firm, which would lead 
to low dispersion and a false interpretation of low transparency.
5
 Therefore, I also look at a 
second variable for transparency which is defined as the accuracy of analyst estimates as 
suggested by Elton, Gruber and Gultekin (1984), Christie (1987), Dadalt, Gay and Nam (2001), 
and Atiase and Bamber (1994). All these studies show a positive correlation between firms with 
                                               
5 Barry and Brown (1981) and Givoly and Lakonishok (1984), among others, argue that analyst dispersion is a valid 
proxy for information risk, while Diether, Malloy and Scherbina (2002) and others consider it a proxy for 
differences of opinion among analysts. 
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higher forecast errors and those with higher levels of information asymmetry between managers 
and market participants regarding a firm’s cash flows. The resultant variable ACCUR, which is 
used in these studies as well as this one, is: 
 
where, EPS FOR is the last average earnings per share released prior to the release of the actual 
earnings and EPSACT is the actual earnings per share firm. The earnings data is obtained from 
IBES and the prices are obtained from CRSP.  ACCUR captures opaqueness since it increases in 
deviation from the actual earnings. For ease of interpretation, I create an accuracy variable which 
is: 
Accuracy= — ACCUR 
 Thus, both proxies are designed to capture the ability of the market to understand the cash 
flows of the firm.   
3.3 Measure of Risk 
 Risk is calculated as the daily volatility of stock returns for the 365 days prior to the 
release of the actual EPS, as defined in ExecuComp. The variable Risk is winsorized at five 
percent. Thus values below the 5
th
 percentile (above the 95
th
 percentile) take on the values at the 
5
th
 (95
th
) percentile. This minimizes the likelihood that the results are driven by an abnormally 
high or low volatility calculation. Additionally, the stock must have at least ten months of data to 
be included in the analysis.   
 I also measure risk as the volatility of returns for the sixty months prior to the applicable 
earnings’ forecast. I use this measure for consistency with current research. However I do not use 
it in my main regressions because of the time overlap limitations. Since I argue that 
Transparency is an independent variable that helps to explain risk, the fact that the sixty month 
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calculation precedes the independent variable presents an econometric issue and leads to 
difficulty in interpreting the results.    
3.4 Measures of Human Capital 
Ranft and Lord (2002) highlight the importance of human capital in certain industries 
through a study of mergers and acquisitions.  Those industries are computer hardware and 
software, electronics, telecommunications, biotechnology, and pharmaceuticals.  They show that 
many of these mergers and acquisitions are designed with the goal of acquiring technical 
expertise and that the acquirers are willing to pay handsomely to attain and retain that human 
capital.   Therefore, I use high technology industries as a proxy for human capital. 
I use a measure based on Kwon (2002), who classifies firms as high technology and low 
technology firms based on their three-digit SIC code, to capture human capital. The variable is a 
dummy variable set to 1 if the firm is in an industry classified as high technology and 0 
otherwise. The expectation is that highly technical firms rely more on specialized skill and 
intellectual expertise, so the pool of available candidates is expected to be smaller which drives 
up replacement and retention costs. High tech firms exhibiting a stronger relationship between 
transparency and risk would be consistent with the argument that human capital costs provide an 
incentive for managers to adjust firm risk. Appendix C provides the list of firms coded as 1. Any 
industry not listed is coded as 0.  
3.5 Compensation 
 The sensitivity of CEO option grants to stock volatility (Vega) and stock price changes 
(Delta) are added to the regression to capture the risk taking behavior of the managerial 
compensation scheme. Vega and Delta are calculated using the method used by Coles, Daniel 
and Naveen (2006) and is outlined in Appendix A.  According to Hermalin and Weisbach 
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(2007) the increasing Delta should have a mitigating effect on the relationship between risk and 
transparency.  This result should hold even after controlling for the manager’s incentives to take 
risks (vega). 
3.6 Measures of Controls 
 The controls used in the specification used for Risk follow Coles, Daniel and Naveen 
(2006) and include both firm and CEO characteristics such as Market-to-Book, Size, CEO 
Tenure, Tobin’s Q, and Leverage. I measure Size as the natural log of total assets or sales. Since 
both measures for Size give similar results, I report only results based on using Ln (Sales). 
Similarly, I calculate Leverage as both book leverage and market leverage. Once again, the 
results are similar, so I only report the regressions that use book leverage. Firm Age is defined as 
the number of years the firm has appeared in the Compustat database. Finally, I define Distress 
Dummy as an indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s earnings are negative, and zero 
otherwise.  
3.7 Sample Description 
I present summary statistics in table 1. The mean (median) value for Risk is 0.45% 
(0.36%). The mean (median) value for Analyst Dispersion is -0.0025 (0.0009). The mean 
(median) value for Accuracy is -0.008 (-0.012). The median firm in my sample has been present 
in the Compustat database for 19 years. The mean (median) value for CEO Tenure is 6.03 (4) 
years. The mean value for Delta, the sensitivity of the CEO’s total option holdings at the 
beginning of the year is $602,000. This indicates that for a unit change in the stock price, the 
mean value for the change in a CEO’s option holdings is $602,000. Similarly, for a unit change 
in the mean volatility by 1%, this will change the CEO’s option holdings by about $64,000, as 
indicated by Vega. The summary statistics for the remaining variables are largely consistent with 
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the extant literature. Table 2 describes the correlation among main variables. Analyst Dispersion 
is negatively correlated with Risk at a level of 0.13, while Accuracy is negatively correlated with 
Risk at a level of 0.13. Both correlations are significant at the one percent level. Younger and 
smaller firms are also positively correlated with Risk. Additionally, Delta is negatively correlated 
with Risk while Vega is positively correlated with Risk. The coefficient for Delta is significant at 
one percent while the coefficient for Vega is significant at five percent. 
4. Transparency and Risk 
 I begin the analysis with an OLS regression using Risk as the dependent variable. The 
independent variables include the proxies for Transparency as well as controls for Risk and is 
designed to determine if there is a relationship between Risk and Transparency. The resultant 
model is: 
Riski,t = α,t + β1Transparencyi,t-1 +  β2CEO Tenurei,t +  β3Firm Agei,t +  β4Sizei,t + 
β5Market-to-Booki,t + β6Book Leveragei,t + β7Deltai,t-1 + β8Vegai,t-1 + β9Distress Dummyi,t 
+ Fixed Effectsi,t  
4.1 Analyst Dispersion 
 Table 3 presents the result of the OLS regressions on Risk, using two measures of 
transparency. The first model uses Analyst Dispersion and the second model uses Accuracy as 
the proxy for transparency.     
 The first model indicates that the relationship between transparency and risk is negative 
and statistically significant using Analyst Dispersion as the proxy for transparency. The 
coefficient for Analyst Dispersion is -2.62 and is significant at the one percent level. This is 
consistent with the hypothesis that higher transparency levels result in lower firm risk. Other 
variables in the model are generally consistent with the extant literature. Smaller, younger, 
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distressed, and more leveraged firms are riskier. I also find that Vega is positively related to Risk 
while Delta is negatively related to Risk. The coefficient for Delta is statistically significant at 
one percent.  The expected sign for Delta can be either positive since higher delta increases the 
incentive to shift risk to debt holders.  It can also be negative since managers could choose less 
risky projects to offset the fact that higher delta exposes the manager to more risk (see Coles, 
Daniel, and Naveen (2006) for a detailed explanation).  Additionally, the coefficient for Vega is 
positive as predicted, and significant at one percent. As in Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006), I 
use the lagged values for Vega and Delta in the specifications. My findings are consistent with 
theirs. 
 The two variables that do not have significant coefficients are CEO Tenure and the HT 
dummy. The coefficient for HT dummy is negative as expected, but not significant. The 
coefficient for the tenure of the CEO is also negative. However, there is no clear consensus on 
the expected direction. One the one hand, CEOs with longer tenure are closer to retirement and 
may want to minimize the risk of their future compensation and consequently reduce firm risk, 
since a larger component of their total compensation is likely tied to the firm’s output . 
Alternatively, CEOs with higher tenure are more entrenched in the firm than those with shorter 
tenures and thus are not as concerned about employment risk; inducing them to take on riskier 
projects since they are not as sensitive to the negative effects of bad outcomes. The relation 
between CEO Tenure and Risk therefore will depend on the relative strengths of these opposing 
effects.   
4.2 Accuracy 
 The second model in Table 3 measures the impact of transparency on risk using Accuracy 
as the measure of transparency. Consistent with the standard deviation of analyst forecasts, I 
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observe a negative relationship between Accuracy and Risk suggesting that managers respond to 
higher levels of transparency with lower levels of risk. The coefficient is -0.3694 and is 
significant at one percent. Results for all other variables are similar to those in column 1. For 
example, smaller, younger, leveraged, distressed, firms tend to be riskier. These variables are 
significant at one percent level. Additionally, Vega is positively related to Risk with a coefficient 
of 0.0003 and is significant at one percent. Consistent with previous studies, higher sensitivity of 
CEO wealth to stock volatility induces managers to choose riskier strategies. The coefficient for 
Delta is negative and statistically significant at one percent. As observed in the previous model, 
the coefficients for CEO Tenure and HT dummy are not found to be significant in the model.  
The coefficient for HT dummy is negative as predicted. 
4.3 Endogeneity 
 Since the manager makes decisions that affect both firm risk and firm transparency 
levels, it is likely that several managerial characteristics, observable and unobservable affect the 
dependent variable (Risk) as well as the main independent variable (Transparency). While I have 
included certain observable characteristics such as tenure and incentives, there are unobservable 
variables such as managerial ability which may come into play. For instance, higher ability 
managers may arguably undertake riskier projects and perhaps confidently make their firms more 
transparent. Further, managerial ability could change over time. To address the potential 
endogeneity arising out of time variant unobservable variables, I use a two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) approach, where the second stage models firm risk as a function of transparency and 
various controls as in the case of the OLS regressions.   
 In the first stage, I estimate transparency as a function of the variables used to model risk 
and additional variables used as instrument variables. The first model in Table 4 presents the 
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results from the two stage regression with Transparency as the main endogenous variable. The 
main instruments I use in this specification are Industry Dispersion and Earnings Dummy. 
Industry Transparency is the negative of the average dispersion based on industry as defined by 
its SIC. There is no economic reason to expect that Risk is correlated with this measure.  
However, since it is the industry average, it is related to Transparency.    
 Earnings Dummy is set to one if earnings decreased from the previous period. Ciccone 
(2003) find it to be an explanatory variable for transparency as do I. This makes sense based on 
the premise that a decline in earnings is negative news and it is more likely to be released in a 
transparent firm as opposed to an opaque firm since release of strong performance is good news 
for the company and manager while the release of poor performance is not. However, it is also 
conceivable that a decline in earnings makes a firm riskier.  Thus, I test the validity of the 
instruments. 
 The F-statistic in the first stage of 25.76 indicates that the instruments are jointly relevant. 
Further, both instruments are statistically significant in the first stage regression presented in the 
second column. The Hansen – J statistic (value = 0.16) is unable to reject the null that the 
instruments are exogenous to the residuals, indicating that they exhibit valid instrument 
properties. As shown in the second stage regression in Table 4, Analyst Dispersion is negatively 
related to firm Risk. This relationship is statistically significant at the one percent level with a 
coefficient of -5.38 (t-value = 3.48). This implies that higher levels of transparency are offset 
with less risk. Thus my results are robust to corrections for endogeneity.  
 Furthermore, distressed and smaller firms are also found to have more risk. The 
coefficient for Distress Dummy (distressed firms) is 0.010 and significant at one percent. The 
coefficient for Size is also negative at -0.015 and is significant at ten percent.   
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The first stage transparency regression utilizes the methodology of Ciccone (2003). His 
study of analyst dispersion properties highlights the need for the following controls: Size, Book 
Leverage, Distress Dummy (set to one when the actual earnings in year t are less than zero and 
zero otherwise), and Earnings Dummy (set to one when actual earnings in year t are less than 
those in year t-1 and zero otherwise).    
  I also conduct the endogeneity tests with Accuracy as the measure of transparency, and 
present results in Table 4. A similar endogeneity concern holds for the relation between Risk and 
Accuracy. As before, I address this concern econometrically using instrumental variables. 
 Industry Accuracy is the mean industry average of the negative of the absolute difference 
of the average forecasted EPS and the actual EPS based on the SIC code. Analysis indicates that 
Industry Accuracy and Earnings Dummy act as relevant and valid instruments. Both are 
significant in the first stage, and Hansen J tests indicate validity, as shown in Column 2 of Table 
4.  The results are generally similar to the results using Analyst Dispersion.   
 The results of the 2-stage regressions are consistent with the OLS regressions. There is a 
significant inverse relationship between Accuracy and Risk in the second stage. Additionally, 
smaller, younger, more leveraged firms with higher vegas tend to be riskier. On average, the 
variables maintain their directional relationship, but do not maintain significance. For example, 
Size is significant at ten percent and the Distress Dummy variable is significant at five percent. 
Vega maintains significance at the one percent level, but the HT dummy is no longer significant. 
 Overall, the results indicate a negative relationship between transparency and risk. These 
results hold for both proxies of transparency. Additionally, both are robust to econometric 
adjustments for endogeneity. These results are consistent with the argument that managers prefer 
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lower risk when transparency is high. The following tables further explain the relationship and 
test the impact of the compensation scheme and human capital costs.  
5. Career Concerns for Managers and Non-managers 
 Based on theoretical models presented in this study, two factors can interact with the risk 
and transparency relationship. One model is based on managerial career concerns and the other is 
based on non-manager career concerns, or the cost of retaining quality employees.  The 
distinction between the two models is important since career concern is a private managerial 
incentive and can adversely affect the value of the firm if these incentives drive the manager to 
reduce risk below optimal levels from a shareholder point of view. On the other hand, the 
argument based on the cost of retaining quality employees, is a shareholder wealth based 
argument and works in the shareholders’ best interest. The results heretofore do not clearly 
distinguish between the two incentives. Therefore, I add interaction terms to model incentives 
based on managerial career concerns (as captured by managerial compensation) and human 
capital concerns (as captured by the level of firm technology). 
5.1 Non-manager Career Concerns 
 I control for the level of technology using Kwon’s (2002) technology classifications, 
which are based on the 3-digit SIC codes to capture human capital costs. According to Kwon 
(2002), firms can either be high technology (high human capital, such as specializing in research 
and testing services) or low technology (low human capital, such as a grocery store). I create a 
dummy variable set to one if the industry is considered high technology as defined in Kwon 
(2002) and set to zero otherwise.  Appendix 3 identifies the high technology firms as identified 
by its three-digit SIC code. 
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 The human capital costs argument is based on the costs of retaining workers. Those costs 
are highest in industries that require specialized skill or those for which the pool of qualified 
candidates is smallest. High tech firms as defined by Kwon (2002) would fall into this category.  
This group includes technology, research, electronics, and other industries. Managers in these 
firms have incentives to make special efforts to retain the qualified employees they employ. This 
includes suppressing negative firm information that might convince these employees to seek 
employment elsewhere. In a transparent firm, reducing risk is one method that can be employed.  
Reducing risk is of greatest benefit to firms that have the highest human capital costs. This 
suggests that the inverse relationship between risk and transparency should be strongest for high 
tech firms. Therefore, I then create an interaction term by multiplying the HT Dummy variable 
with the measures for transparency.  A negative coefficient would be supportive of this theory. 
 Table 5 reports results from the relationship between Transparency and Risk for models 
including interaction terms. The coefficient for the high technology interaction term is positive 
and significant for transparency as measured by analyst dispersion. The positive coefficient 
suggests that highly technical firms partially mitigate the effects transparency which is negative.  
On average, this result is not consistent with the study by Almazan, Suarez, and Titman (2004) 
which suggests that human capital costs should induce lower risk when transparency is high. A 
possible explanation for the opposite finding based on the fact that high technology firms are 
usually riskier than low technology firms.  Therefore high technology firms benefit more from 
the positive influence of transparency (i.e. reduced cost of capital, increased liquidity, etc) and 
can thus chooses a higher degree of risk relative to lower technology firms. 
5.2 Compensation 
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 Compensation has previously been shown as a factor in determining risk. To determine 
whether or not it is also conditional on transparency, I add an interaction terms to the model in 
Table 5. I find that the interaction term using Delta is significant for Analyst Dispersion as 
shown in column 1. The coefficient for the interaction term is significant at one percent level. 
The positive value of the interaction of Delta and Transparency provides strong evidence that the 
level of managerial wealth reduces the impact of transparency on risk. This is consistent with the 
argument that managers require additional pay to bear increased risk when firms are more 
transparent. In essence, managers require higher pay for transparent firms when risk is high. This 
is in line with the argument of Hermalin and Weisbach (2007). I also find that the same 
explanation holds for transparency when Accuracy is the proxy for transparency as listed in 
column 2. The only difference is that the interaction term with Delta is now significant at ten 
percent. The control variables are generally consistent with predictions. The exception is Book 
Leverage. However, the coefficient is not statistically significant.  This result is consistent with 
the hypothesis that the compensation structure has a mitigating effect on the relationship between 
risk and transparency. 
5.3 Endogeneity 
 Endogeneity remains a concern with the addition of the interaction terms. To the extent 
that Transparency is endogenous, it is plausible that each interaction term is also endogenous.  
Thus I instrument the interaction terms using measures based on the mean of transparency.  
Additionally, I use Earnings dummy as an instrument, which exhibited strength in the models 
without interaction terms. I also test a geographical based dummy that is one for firms located in 
New York, Illinois, or California.  The reason is based on the supposition that those states house 
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a concentration of large analysts firms and the proximity may provide an information gathering 
edge.   
 Table 6 lists the results of the model using interaction terms based on the mean of the 
industry and earnings to instrument for Transparency.  The coefficient for the interaction term 
utilizing technology is negative as expected, but is not significant.  The direction indicates that 
high technology firms amplify the effect of the relationship between transparency and risk 
similar to the OLS regressions. 
   The coefficient for the interaction term based on the managers’ compensation structure is 
significant at ten percent.  Additionally, it is positive as expected.  I also continue to find that 
distressed, smaller firms exhibit higher risk.  The F-statistics range from 12.78 to 24.83.  
Additionally, the coefficient for the Anderson-Rubin is significant while the Hansen-J is not. 
 Table 6 also contains the model for the regression using Accuracy.  This model uses 
instruments based on compensation and level of technology. As with the interaction terms the 
model in the model using Analyst Dispersion, not all are significant. The only significant 
coefficient is associated with the interaction term comprised of Accuracy and Delta. The 
interaction term utilizing Delta (Accuracy*Lag of Delta) is significant at five percent. The 
coefficient is positive and thus mitigates the effects of transparency on risk as expected. Once 
again, the result is consistent with the explanation that managers require increased compensation 
to maintain risk under increased transparency. 
 The results suggest support for the explanation of managerial career incentives as 
modeled by Hermalin and Weisbach (2007).  This is true for both the OLS regressions and the 
2SLS regressions.  However, results are not consistent with the explanation that increased human 
capital costs provide incentives for the manager to reduce risk when transparency is high. 
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6. Proxy based on Standard and Poor’s Transparency and Disclosure Score 
 A third measure of transparency is based on the S&P Transparency and Disclosure 
Rankings, which were released on October 15, 2002. Standard & Poor’s released the ranking of 
Transparency and disclosure (T&D) scores for the S&P 500 firms. The rankings are a qualitative 
measure of the disclosures contained in the firms’ annual reports and regulatory filings and 
consist of three subcategories of disclosure that S&P asserts are relevant in assessing firms' 
corporate governance mechanisms: ownership structure and investor rights, financial 
transparency and information disclosure, and board and management structure and process. 
These are also aggregated into an overall score.
6
  
In this assessment of governance and disclosure practices by S&P, a higher ranking 
indicates more disclosure. However, S&P calculated the rankings only for those firms on the 
S&P 500 in 2001, so the utility of the event study is limited.
 7
 I use individual firm characteristics 
and the S&P score to model a predicted T&D score. 
6.1 Actual T&D Score 
 Table 7, column 1 presents results of the OLS regressions based on the Ln(T&D score) as 
published by Standard and Poor’s in 2002 for their 2001 firms. Since the score exists for one 
year, I adjust the test sample forward by one year.  The Ln(T&D) is calculated for 2001.  It 
should be a lagged variable in the OLS regressions.  Thus, all other variables, with the exception 
of Delta and Vega, are calculated using 2002 data. The coefficient for the log of the S&P’s T&D 
score is -0.07 and significant at one percent indicating that higher transparency is associated with 
lower levels of risk. As with previous results, smaller, younger, financially distressed firms are 
                                               
6 See Dallas and Patel (2002) for a detailed explanation of how the scores are determined. 
7 While the S&P contains 500 firms, due to data availability, only 460 received scores.  See Patel, S. A. and G. S. 
Dallas (2002). Transparency and Disclosure: Overview of Methodology and Study Results - United States, SSRN for 
a complete list. 
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riskier. Compensation also behaves in a matter as expected based on previous literature. Vega 
increases with risk while Delta decreases. Both are significant at one percent. As shown in 
column 2, the interaction terms are not significant. However, the direction for the high tech 
interaction terms has the expected direction. 
 Table 8 report results from 2SLS regressions. The first column uses the natural log of the 
2001 Standard and Poor’s Transparency and Disclosure Score without interaction terms. Since 
Risk and Transparency are endogenously determined, I do not adjust the dataset forward.  I find 
a negative relationship between Risk and Transparency at a level of one percent. Additionally, 
the coefficient for Delta is negative as expected and significant at one percent. These results are 
consistent with the previous models and highlight the existence of the relationship between risk 
and transparency. 
 An analysis of the interaction terms in column two is not consistent with the importance 
of the manager’s compensation package. The coefficient is positive as and significant at the ten 
percent level. However, it is difficult to interpret this as strong evidence against the 
compensation argument since it is only one year and a tumultuous year at that. The score was 
developed in 2002 using 2001 data. This is also the time period when numerous firm scandals 
came to light (such as Enron) and regulators were meeting to discuss various courses of action.  
It is possible that the manager’s were reacting to the market uproar and during this time, the 
uncertain future superseded the potential gains from performance based compensation. The 
coefficient for the high tech interaction term is negative as expected, but is insignificant. 
6.2 Predicted Model 
  33 
The description of the methodology I use to predict a Transparency and Disclosure is 
explained in the rest of this section. However, the strongest correlation between the predicted 
score and actual score that I obtain is .30.  
 First, I create multiple linear models based on the following firm characteristics: number 
of employees, 60 month volatility of stock returns, Delta, Vega, Capital Expenditures, R&D 
expenses, Advertising costs, Book Leverage, Market Leverage, Market to Book, Size of Assets, 
Size of Sales, Tobin’s Q, Value of Net Property Plant and Equipment, Sale of Property Plant and 
Equipment, the Altman Z Score, the Amount of Surplus Cash, the Amount of Collateral, the 
Amount of Deficit for the Firm, the Amount of Common Equity, the Amount of Convertible 
Debt, Net Income, Operating Cash Flow, the Number of Analysts, the Dispersion of the 
Volatility of Returns, the Change in Earnings, Earnings Dummy, Distress Dummy, the Age of 
the Firm, the Age of the CEO, the Geographical Location of the Firm (State), the Financing 
Deficit, the Firm’s Return on Assets, the Industry’s Return on Assets, the Sales Growth of the 
Firm, and the Change in Tangibles for the Firm. Additionally, I use the log and the lag of the 
variables where appropriate. The variables are obtained from Compustat. These characteristics 
are used since they provide information about the cash flows of the firm, about the characteristics 
of the firm, or about the characteristics of the manager and as such may be related to the 
transparency of the firm. Additionally, I limited the variables by available data. While Compustat 
contains numerous variables, not all are fully populated. Since I have such a small dataset, I only 
include variables with at least 75% availability. Each variable is classified in either the cash flow 
group, firm characteristic group, or manager characteristic group. 
  The dataset is limited by the number of observations (460) used in the original S&P 
study. The number of observations in turn limits the number of variables that can be used and 
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still maintains the ability to create an econometrically viable matrix for regression purposes. 
Therefore, I create a basic model using groups outlined above and proxies for transparency. The 
generalized model is: 
Predicted Scorei,t = α,t + β1Transparencyi,t +  β2Cash Flow Measurei,t +  β3Firm 
Characteristic Measurei,t +  β4Manager Characteristic Measurei,t + Ei,t  
Since the goal is to find as additional proxy for transparency, I add transparency to the model 
with the expectation that the predicted score should be correlated with proxies for transparency 
currently in use. However, when testing the various models, I did test them with and without 
currently available transparency proxies. I create a set of generic models using the characteristics 
obtained from Compustat and described above. I limit the models to two proxies per measure for 
parsimony. Since the Scores are bounded between 1 and 10, I create the models transforming the 
score using the natural log of the score.   
The specific regressions are created by separating the 460 firms that received S&P scores 
into two groups to create an out of sample list for testing purposes. I randomly extract 260 Firms 
from the sample to create a test group, which leaves 200 firms for the out of sample group.  
While the sample drawn is random, there is a certain amount of homogeneity among the firms 
since all meet the criteria to be listed in the S&P 500.   
I create the regression models using the Transparency and Disclosure Score based on the 
characteristics of Standard and Poor’s score using the 260 firms in the test group. The dependent 
variable is created using the log transformation of the S&P Transparency and Disclosure Score 
as the dependent variable. I create predicted scores for each regression model using the out of 
sample group. I then calculate the Root Mean Squared Error of the Predicted Score from the 
model and the Actual Score for the out of sample group. I repeat the process with the next 
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generic model.  I keep the regression with the lowest Root Mean Squared error (MSE). The 
predictive model based on minimizing the Root Mean Squared Error that emerges is: 
 Ln(Score)=1.972-5.47782*Accuracyt-1+0.24907*Market Leverage+ 0.207031*Surplus Cash. 
This model results in the lowest overall Root MSE of 0.064.
8
 The Predicted Transparency Score 
has Accuracyt-1, and Market Leverage as explanatory variables.   
 These explanatory variables are consistent with expectations for firm transparency.  For 
example, Market Leverage is consistent with Easterbrook (1984) who argues that when firms are 
forced to pay out a higher fraction of their cash flow, they are subject to greater scrutiny because 
of their need to access external capital. Such scrutiny benefits those firms by reducing agency 
problems between shareholders and managers. The model by Almazan, Suarez, and Titman 
suggest the suitability of using leverage as a proxy for transparency. The appropriateness of 
Accuracy follows from the argument that both Accuracy and the S&P Transparency and 
Disclosure Score are proxies for firm transparency.  Finally, Surplus Cash as an asset is easily 
valued and as such, should be positively correlated with transparency. 
6.3 Results with Predicted T&D Score 
 The results with the predicted T&D score are consistent the models using other proxies 
for transparency as shown in Table 9. The coefficient for the Ln(Predicted TD) is negative and 
significant at one percent. Additionally, all control variables are in line with current literature and 
the other proxies for transparency. Smaller, distressed, more highly leveraged, younger firms are 
riskier.  The coefficient for Vega is positive while Delta is negative.  Results continue to confirm 
a negative relationship between the level firm risk and the level of firm transparency. 
6.4 Human Capital and Compensation  
                                               
8 The strongest model that did not involve a transformation of the score had a root mean squared error of 0.46. This 
non-transformed model is used as a robustness check with similar results. 
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 The second column in Table 9 includes interaction terms based on managerial 
compensation and human capital. The interaction using Delta continues to be significant.  The 
coefficient is positive and significant at one percent. The direction of the coefficient suggests 
Delta softens the relationship between risk and transparency. Thus, holding transparency 
constant, managers require increased compensation to maintain the firm’s level of risk.  This is 
consistent with the argument that transparency is associated with higher compensation costs.  
Once again, results follow Hermalin and Weisbach (2007). 
 The coefficient for the interaction with the HT Dummy and Transparency is positive as in 
the previous models. It is significant at a level of five percent.  Once again, evidence does not 
support the argument that managers reduce firm risk in an effort to minimize human capital 
costs.  Instead, managers seem to take advantage of the benefits of transparency. 
6.5 Endogeneity 
  The negative relationship between Risk and Transparency is robust to econometric 
adjustments for endogeneity as highlighted in the first column of Table 10.   The coefficient for 
Ln(Predicted TD) is negative and significant at the five percent level.  Additionally, distressed 
firms are riskier and Vega increases in firm risk. 
 When the interaction terms are included, they maintain the expected sign, but are not 
significant.  It is also important to note that the instrument variables do not maintain all the 
necessary properties.  For example, while the other endogenous variables have F-statistics above 
10, the F-statistic for Ln(Predicted TD)*HT Dummy is 3.67.  Thus, I am unable to make 
interpretations based on this model.  I also adjust the errors using the technique of bootstrapping 
to determine significance for both the predicted and actual Transparency and Disclosure Scores.  
The tests were run with the default of 50 iterations and then again with 100 iterations.  In all 
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cases, results were consistent.  For example interaction coefficients in Table 10 column 2 remain 
insignificant.  Additionally, the Sargan statistics for the models are listed in table 10.  The Sargan 
statistic is 1.665 and the p-value is 0.1970 for the model that includes the interaction terms.  The 
Sargan statistics reflect the models based on 100 iterations. 
7. Conclusion 
This study analyzes the impact of the degree of firm transparency on a manager’s risk 
taking behavior. Risk is measured as the overall firm risk based on the volatility of stock returns.  
Transparency is measured using analyst forecast measures.  I find a negative relationship 
between firm risk and firm transparency.  This result holds while controlling for endogeneity, 
through the use of lagged variable and 2SLS. The result continues to hold for transparency as 
measured by Analyst Dispersion, Accuracy and my Predicted Transparency and Disclosure 
Score. Therefore, I interpret this as evidence that managers have on average incentives to reduce 
risk under higher levels of transparency.  This finding is consistent with Hermalin and Weisbach 
(2007) and Almazan, Suarez, and Titman (2004), but not with John, Litov, and Yeung (2008).  
Since the tests are not mutually exclusive, it possible that the firm has incentive to increase risk, 
but that the incentive does not dominate the incentive to decrease risk. 
I also test two theories that suggest an influence on the relationship between risk and 
transparency. One theory is based on the manager’s desire to protect his personal career and 
compensation and the other theory is based on the firm’s desire to manage employee reservation 
wages. Understanding managers’ motivations with regard to his career concerns versus those of 
other employees is essential because they have different implications for shareholders. A 
manager who keeps valuable employees while minimizing the reservation wage is making 
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decisions in the best interest of the shareholders.  However, a manager who makes decisions to 
protect his personal job may lead to additional costs for the shareholders.  
 While I find that human capital costs are a factor in the relationship between risk and 
transparency in many of the regressions, results of the directional impact are mixed. For 
example, the coefficient is positive and significant in some models while negative and 
insignificant in others. I find, in some instances, that firms in high technology industries offset 
the negative correlation between risk and transparency. One explanation could be that since these 
firms are riskier by nature, they derive a larger benefit from the positive aspects of transparency. 
These benefits include the reduction of asymmetric information, the reduction of the cost of 
capital, and an increase in liquidity. These benefits are stronger than the cost of retaining workers 
leading to these firms increasing risk when transparency is high.  In other cases, I find that firms 
in high technology industries magnify the negative relationship between risk and transparency.  
These findings are consistent with Almazan, Suarez, and Titman (2004). 
I find strong support for the argument that the level of firm transparency impacts the 
amount of risk the manager is willing to take and that the manager’s compensation factors into 
his decision. In line with Hermalin and Weisbach (2007), my findings indicate that compensation 
sensitivity partially mitigates the negative relationship between risk and transparency.  This is a 
very important issue since the current corporate environment seems to prefer greater 
transparency.  
Furthermore, managerial compensation is a current topic of interest and area of concern. 
Determining the level of transparency and managerial compensation independent of each other 
can lead to the manager choosing a suboptimal level of risk or unanticipated costs being leveled 
against the shareholders.  Thus the interaction between transparency and the manager’s 
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compensation package has implications for any group involved in setting firm transparency 
and/or the manager’s compensation package.  This includes the managers, the shareholders, and 
regulators. 
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Appendix A: Calculation of Vega and Delta Measures      
This appendix explains how the Delta and Vega measures used in this paper have been 
calculated. I follow the methodology discussed in Core and Guay (2002) and Guay (1999). The 
explanation is from Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006).   
 
Value and sensitivities for a single option 
I calculate the option value based on Black-Scholes formula (Black and Scholes, 1973) for 
valuing European call options, as modified by Merton (1973) to account for dividend payouts. 
 
Option value = Se
-dt
N(Z) – Xe-rtN(Z-T(1/2)) 
where  Z = [ln(S/X) + T(r-d+2/2)]/T(1/2) 
S = price of the underlying stock 
X = exercise price of the option 
T = time to maturity of the option in years 
r = log of risk-free interest rate 
= expected stock-return volatility over the life of the option 
N( ) = cumulative probability function for the normal distribution 
 
Delta = the sensitivity of the option value with respect to a 1% change in stock price 
          = e
-dt
N(Z)*(price/100) 
Vega = the sensitivity of the option value with respect to a 0.01 change in stock volatility 
         = e
-dt
N(Z)*ST(1/2)*0.01 
 
where N(Z) is the normal density function. I multiply the sensitivity and delta by the number of 
options to obtain the total dollar values of the change in CEO’s wealth that will result from a 
1% change in stock price and 0.01 change in stock volatility. 
 
Value and sensitivities for portfolio of options 
I compute fiscal year end value and sensitivities of executives’ option portfolios using the Core 
and Guay (2002) approximation method. I use ExecuComp data, which gives the realizable value 
(the potential gains from exercising all options on the fiscal year end price) and the number of 
options separately for both exercisable and unexercisable options and details of the current year’s 
option grant.        
 
1.  For the current year’s grant, I compute the Black-Scholes value and sensitivities using the 
above formulae. 
 
2.  For previously granted options, I compute the Black-Scholes value and sensitivities 
separately for exercisable and unexercisable options. 
a.  I compute the average exercise price separately for the portfolio of exercisable 
options and unexercisable options. This is done in two steps. First, I divide the 
realizable value by the number of options, which gives the average of (stock price – 
exercise price). Second, I subtract this number from the stock price to arrive at the 
average exercise price.      
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b.  For exercisable options, I set the time to maturity as three years less than the time to 
maturity of the current year’s options grants, or six years if no grant was made in the 
current year.      
c.  For unexercisable options, I set the time to maturity equal to one year less than the 
time to maturity of the current year’s options grants, or nine years if no grant was 
made in the current year. 
d.  I then compute the Black-Scholes option value, delta, and vega using the average 
exercise price and time to maturity. 
 
3.  I calculate the delta of the manager’s portfolio of stocks and options by adding the delta of 
restricted stock and shares held by the CEO to the delta of his options portfolio.  The delta of 
stock = the fractional shareholding * 0.01 * stock price.  The vega of the manager’s portfolio 
of stock and options = vega of new options granted + vega of all exercisable options held + 
vega of all unexercisable options held. I do not estimate separately the vega of restricted 
stock and shares as Guay (1999) finds that this value is insignificant compared to the vega 
from options. 
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Appendix B:   Variable Definitions    
 
Dependent 
Variables 
Source Definition 
Risk CRSP 
Variance of the daily stock returns calculated over the current 
year. 
      
Independent 
Variables 
Source Definition 
Analyst 
Dispersion 
IBES 
The negative of the standard deviation of the current fiscal year 
EPS forecasts, scaled by the stock price. 
Transparency 
Score 
S&P 
website 
S&P Transparency and Disclosure Rankings released on 
10/15/2002. 
Accuracy IBES The negative of the ABS[(EPSfor-EPSact) / Price]. 
CEO Age ExecuComp 
The age of the CEO.  When missing, the average CEO age for 
the current year is used. 
CEO Tenure ExecuComp 
The tenure of the CEO.  When missing, the average CEO tenure 
for the current year is used. 
Book 
Leverage 
Compustat Total debt divided by book value of assets. 
Market 
Leverage 
Compustat Total debt divided by market value of assets. 
Market-to-
Book 
Compustat 
(Number of shares outstanding times share price at fiscal year-
end, minus book value of common equity plus book value of 
total assets) to the book value of total assets. 
Size Compustat 
Calculated as natural logarithm of total assets or natural 
logarithm of total sales. 
Distress 
Dummy 
Compustat Dummy set to one if earnings are less than zero 
Tobin’s Q Compustat 
Sum of the market value of equity, liquidating value of the 
firm’s outstanding preferred stock, value of the firm’s short term 
liabilities net of its short term assets, and book value of the 
firm’s long-term debt divided by the total assets of the firm. 
ROA Compustat 
Ratio of earnings before interest and taxes (#178) to total assets 
(#6) multiplied by 100 and adjusted by the industry median 
(using 3-digit SIC codes).  
Industry 
Accuracy 
IBES Industry median of Accuracy based on the 3-digit SIC codes.  
Industry  
Transparency 
IBES 
Industry median of Analyst Dispersion based on the 3-digit SIC 
codes 
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Independent 
Variables 
Source Definition 
Earnings 
Dummy 
Compustat 
Dummy variable set to 1 if earnings decrease from the previous 
year and 0 otherwise 
Ln(Predicted 
TD) 
Compustat Prediction of the Ln(Transparency and Disclosure Score) 
Delta  ExecuComp See Appendix A 
Vega  ExecuComp See Appendix A 
Sales Growth Compustat Relative change in net sales (#12) from the previous period.  
Financing 
Deficit 
Compustat 
The sum of cash dividends, investments, changes in working 
capital, internal cash flow.  Computed using the exact Frank and 
Goyal (2003) specification.   
Change in 
Tangibles 
Compustat 
Change in the ratio of property, plants, and equipment (item #8) 
to the book value of total assets (item #6).  
Change in 
ROA 
Compustat 
Percentage change in firm-level earnings before interest and 
taxes over total assets.  
Industry ROA  Compustat 
Ratio of earnings before interest and taxes (#13) to total assets 
(#6), multiplied by 100. Measured at industry median, based on 
3-digit SIC codes.   
Industry 
Market-to-
Book 
Compustat 
Industry median ratio of MKTVAL, firm market value (item 
#25, number of shares outstanding time item #199, share price 
at fiscal year-end, minus item #60, book value of common 
equity, plus item #6, book value of total assets) to the book 
value of total assets (item #6).  
Industry Sales 
Growth 
  
Relative change in net sales (#12) from the previous period. 
Measured at industry median, based on 3-digit SIC codes.  
Geography Compustat 
Dummy variables for firm location in the state of New York, 
Illinois and California. 
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Appendix C1:   Three-Digit SIC Codes of High-Tech Sample  
 
 
Three-Digit SIC Codes Industry 
 
272  Periodicals 
283  Drugs 
355  Special industry machinery 
357  Computer and office equipment 
360  Electronic and other electric equipment 
361  Electric distribution equipment 
362  Electrical industrial apparatus 
363  Household appliances 
364  Electric lighting and wiring equipment 
365  Household audio and video equipment 
366  Communications equipment 
367  Electronic components and accessories 
369  Miscellaneous electrical equipment and supplies 
381  Search and navigation equipment 
382  Measuring and controlling devices 
481  Telephone communications 
484  Cable and other pay TV services 
489  Communications services, NEC 
573  Radio, TV and electronics stores 
737  Computer and data processing services 
873  Research and testing services 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable   Mean Std Dev Median Lower Quartile Upper Quartile 
Dependent Variable       
Risk  0.4518 0.1944 0.3585 0.2667 0.4930 
       
Transparency       
Analyst Dispersion  -0.0025 0.0077 -0.0009 -0.0051 -0.0004 
Accuracy  -0.0079 0.0381 -0.012 -0.0133 -0.0003 
       
Firm Characteristics       
Firm Age (yrs)  22.2300 14.80 19 9 33 
Sales ($000s)  4796 12904 1263 451 3957 
Book Leverage  0.2336 .1880 0.2191 0.0806 0.3407 
Market-to-Book  2.0768 2.3489 1.5131 1.1633 2.2229 
HT Dummy  0.2600 0.4387 0 0 1 
Distress Dummy  0.3281 0.4695 0 0 1 
       
CEO Characteristics       
Vega ($000s)  64 109 54 12 84 
Delta ($000s)  602 1003 188 69 573 
CEO Tenure (yrs)  6.0391 6.5901 4 1 9 
       
Instrument Variables       
Earnings Dummy  0.0695 0.2543 0 0 0 
Industry Transparency  0.0025 0.0018 0.0023 0.0016 0.0031 
Industry Accuracy  0.0079 0.0084 0.0062 0.0036 0.0105 
This table presents descriptive statistics.  Accounting data are obtained from Compustat for 1992-2006 period and the analyst forecast data 
are obtained from IBES. Risk is the daily volatility of stock returns. Analyst Dispersion is the negative of the standard deviation of analyst 
forecasts divided by the fiscal year end price. Accuracy is the negative of the ABS[(EPSfor—EPSact) / Price]. Delta is the dollar sensitivity 
of the option value with respect to a 1% change in stock price. Vega is the dollar sensitivity of the option value with respect to a 0.01 
change in stock volatility. HT Dummy is a Dummy variable set to one for firms in high tech industries as identified by Kwon (2002) and 
zero otherwise. Sales are the total sales. Book Leverage is total debt divided by book value of assets. Market-to-Book is the number of 
shares outstanding times share price at fiscal year-end, minus book value of common equity plus book value of total assets to the book 
value of total assets. CEO Tenure is the tenure of the CEO. When missing, the average CEO tenure for the current year is used. Firm Age 
is the number of years the firm is listed in the Compustat. Distress Dummy takes a value of one if earnings are negative and zero 
otherwise. Industry Dispersion is the industry mean of analyst dispersion. Industry Accuracy is the mean of Accuracy. Earnings Dummy is 
set to one if earningst  are less than earningst-1 and zero otherwise. t-statistics based on robust standard errors are within parentheses.  ***, 
**, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 2 
Correlation Matrix 
 
 Risk 
Analyst 
Dispersion Accuracy Size 
Book 
Leverage 
Market-to- 
Book 
CEO 
Tenure Firm Age Deltat-1 Vegat-1 HT Dummy 
Distress 
Dummy 
Risk 1.00000            
             
             
Analyst 
Dispersion -0.1273* 1.00000           
 0.00000            
             
Accuracy -0.1347* 0.4737* 1.00000          
 0.00000 0.00000           
             
Size -0.3994* 0.0842* 0.0430* 1.00000         
 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000          
             
Book 
Leverage 0.1565* 0.1138* 0.0749* -0.1725* 1.00000        
 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000         
             
Market-to-
Book -0.2431* -0.0978* -0.0715* 0.1709* -0.1381* 1.00000       
 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000        
             
CEO 
Tenure 0.0167* 0.0308* 0.0316* -0.0347* 0.0169* -0.00850 1.00000      
 0.04630 0.00290 0.00220 0.00000 0.03530 0.28750       
             
Firm Age -0.3833* 0.0224* 0.0179* 0.4969* -0.1587* 0.1470* -0.0530* 1.00000     
 0.00000 0.03020 0.08250 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000      
             Continued… 
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Table 2 (Continued)            
 Risk 
Analyst 
Dispersion Accuracy Size 
Book 
Leverage 
Market-to- 
Book 
CEO 
Tenure Firm Age Delta Vega HT Dummy 
Distress 
Dummy 
Deltat-1 -0.3660* -0.0262* -0.01240 0.2197* -0.1649* 0.1578* -0.1359* 0.3574* 1.00000    
 0.00000 0.01110 0.22790 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000     
             
Vegat-1 0.01160* 0.00340 0.00230 0.01120 -0.00630 0.00170 -0.00760 -0.01230 0.01060 1.00000   
 0.03400 0.77570 0.84830 0.23020 0.49870 0.85490 0.41630 0.18720 0.25630    
             
HT Dummy 0.3924* -0.0293* -0.01640 -0.2319* 0.1904* -0.2313* 0.00550 -0.1694* -0.2375* -0.00550 1.00000  
 0.00000 0.00450 0.11240 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.49080 0.00000 0.00000 0.55650   
             
Distress 
Dummy 0.1141* -0.1634* -0.1790* -0.0651* -0.0895* 0.1199* -0.0366* -0.00660 0.0834* -0.00790 0.0202* 1.00000 
 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00040 0.52070 0.00000 0.50620 0.04890  
The correlations among the variables for the period 1992-2006 are presented in this table.  Accounting data are obtained from Compustat for 1992-2006 period and the analyst forecast data 
are obtained from IBES. Risk is the daily volatility of stock returns. Analyst Dispersion is the negative of the standard deviation of analyst forecasts divided by the fiscal year end price. 
Accuracy is the negative of the ABS[(EPSfor—EPSact) / Price]. Delta is the dollar sensitivity of the option value with respect to a 1% change in stock price. Vega is the dollar sensitivity of the 
option value with respect to a 0.01 change in stock volatility. HT Dummy is a Dummy variable set to one for firms in high tech industries as identified by Kwon (2002) and zero otherwise. 
Sales are the total sales. Book Leverage is total debt divided by book value of assets. Market-to-Book is the number of shares outstanding times share price at fiscal year-end, minus book 
value of common equity plus book value of total assets to the book value of total assets. CEO Tenure is the tenure of the CEO. When missing, the average CEO tenure for the current year is 
used. Firm Age is the number of years the firm is listed in the Compustat. Distress Dummy takes a value of one if earnings are negative and zero otherwise. The p-values are in parenthesis. * 
indicate significance at 10% or less. 
  57 
 
TABLE 3 
OLS Regressions of Risk on Analyst Dispersion and Accuracy 
 
Variable Predicted Sign 
    
     Risk 
    
      Risk 
  
    
  
    
  
Constant  
    
0.4297 *** 
    
0.3193 *** 
   
    
(6.30)  
    
(6.23)  
Year Dummies  
    
Yes 
    
Yes 
   
    
  
    
  
Analyst Dispersiont-1 +/- 
    
-2.6211 *** 
    
  
   
    
(-6.23)  
    
  
Accuracyt-1 +/- 
          -0.3694 *** 
             (-4.45)  
Size - 
    
-0.0275 *** 
    
-0.0283 *** 
   
    
(-11.68)  
    
(-12.08)  
Book Leverage + 
    
0.0507 *** 
    
0.0471 *** 
   
    
(3.52)  
    
(3.28)  
Market-to-Book - 
    
-0.0046 *** 
    
-0.0045 *** 
   
    
(-3.13)  
    
(-3.12)  
CEO Tenure +/- 
    
-0.0002   
    
-0.0002   
   
    
(-0.55)  
    
(-0.64)  
Firm Age - 
    
-0.0023 *** 
    
-0.0022 *** 
   
    
(-9.24)  
    
(-9.06)  
Deltat-1 +/- 
    
-0.2052 *** 
    
-0.2062 *** 
   
    
(-7.73)  
    
(-7.76)  
Vegat-1 + 
    
0.0003 *** 
    
0.0003 *** 
   
    
(7.10)  
    
(6.6)  
HT Dummy - 
    
-0.0064   
    
-0.0063   
   
    
(-0.57)  
    
(-0.52)  
Distress Dummy + 
    
0.0180 *** 
    
0.0181 *** 
   
    
(5.4)  
    
(5.41)  
Observations  
    
8049  
    
8048  
R-Squared   
    
0.41   
    
0.40   
This table presents fixed effects regression models with the daily volatility of stock returns (Risk) for firm i for fiscal 
year t as the dependent variable for a sample of firm-year observations made over the period 1992-2006.  Analyst 
Dispersion is the negative of the standard deviation of analyst forecasts divided by the fiscal year end price. Accuracy is 
the negative of the ABS[(EPSfor—EPSact) / Price]. Delta is the dollar sensitivity of the option value with respect to a 1% 
change in stock price. Vega is the dollar sensitivity of the option value with respect to a 0.01 change in stock volatility. 
HT Dummy is a Dummy variable set to one for firms in high tech industries as identified by Kwon (2002) and zero 
otherwise. Control variables are described in Appendix B. The t-values are in parentheses and reflect standard errors that 
are heteroskedasticity robust and corrected for the cluster sample problem arising from multiple observation for each 
firm.  Subscripts (excluding those indicating lags) have been dropped in the table above for ease of presentation.  ***, 
**, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 4 
2SLS Regressions of Risk on Analyst Dispersion and Accuracy  
 
Variable Predicted Sign 
    
          Risk 
    
       Risk 
  
    
  
    
  
Constant  
    
0.1391 *** 
    
0.2075 *** 
   
    
(15.90)  
    
(3.09)  
Year Dummies  
    
Yes  
    
Yes  
   
    
  
    
  
Analyst Dispersion +/- 
    
-5.3789 *** 
    
  
   
    
(-3.48)  
    
  
Accuracy +/-           -0.8679 *** 
             (-3.49)  
Size - 
    
-0.0151 * 
    
-0.0146 * 
   
    
(-1.96)  
    
(-1.79)  
Book Leverage + 
    
0.0412   
    
0.0251   
   
    
(1.55)  
    
(1.05)  
Market-to-Book - 
    
-0.0035   
    
-0.0028   
   
    
(-1.61)  
    
(-1.36)  
CEO Tenure +/- 
    
-0.0004   
    
-0.0005   
   
    
(-1.26)  
    
(-1.41)  
Firm Age - 
    
0.0050   
    
0.0047   
   
    
(0.53)  
    
(0.49)  
Deltat-1 +/- 
    
-0.0267   
    
-0.0262   
   
    
(-1.02)  
    
(-0.99)  
Vegat-1 + 
    
0.0006 *** 
    
0.0005 *** 
   
    
(7.43)  
    
(7.1)  
HT Dummy - 
    
0.0189 * 
    
0.0175   
   
    
(1.79)  
    
(1.64)  
Distress Dummy + 
    
0.0103 *** 
    
0.0085 ** 
      (2.92)      (2.32)  
Observations      9734      9733  
R-Squared      0.49      0.49  
Tests for Relevance and Validity of Instruments 
F-Stat Analyst Dispersion     25.76 ***       
F-Stat Accuracy            20.60 *** 
               
Anderson-Rubin      11.02 ***     10.39 *** 
       (0.0000)      (0.000)  
                  Continued… 
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Table 4 (Continued)             
Hansen J      0.16       1.13   
       (0.6917)      (0.2871)  
Instruments Used:      Industry Dispersion   Industry Accuracy 
      Earnings Dummy    Earnings Dummy 
This table presents fixed effects regression models with the daily volatility of stock returns (Risk) for firm i for fiscal year t 
as the dependent variable for a sample of firm-year observations made over the period 1992-2006.  Analyst Dispersion is 
the negative of the standard deviation of analyst forecasts divided by the fiscal year end price. Accuracy is the negative of 
the ABS[(EPSfor—EPSact) / Price]. Delta is the dollar sensitivity of the option value with respect to a 1% change in stock 
price. Vega is the dollar sensitivity of the option value with respect to a 0.01 change in stock volatility. HT Dummy is a 
Dummy variable set to one for firms in high tech industries as identified by Kwon (2002) and zero otherwise. Control and 
instrument variables are described in Appendix B. The t-values are in parentheses and reflect standard errors that are 
heteroskedasticity robust and corrected for the cluster sample problem arising from multiple observation for each firm.  
Subscripts (excluding those indicating lags) have been dropped in the table above for ease of presentation.  ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 5 
OLS Regressions of Risk on Analyst Dispersion and Accuracy with the Interaction of Compensation and 
Human Capital costs 
 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign 
    
        Risk 
    
      Risk 
              
Constant      0.4025 ***     0.4261 *** 
       (5.73)      (5.98)  
Year Dummies      Yes      Yes  
               
Analyst Dispersiont-1 +/-     -15.299 ***       
       (-3.27)        
Analyst Dispersiont-
1*Deltat-1 + 
    
20.1269 *** 
    
  
      (2.96)        
Analyst Dispersiont-
1*HT Dummy - 
    
3.6362 ** 
    
  
      (2.15)        
Accuracyt-1 +/-           -2.4861 * 
             (-1.94)  
Accuracyt-1*Deltat-1 +           3.5275 * 
            (1.82)  
Accuracyt-1*HT 
Dummy - 
    
  
    
0.6144 * 
            (1.71)  
Size -     -0.0171 *     -0.0178  
       (-1.55)      (-1.57)  
Book Leverage +     -0.0131       -0.0145   
       (-0.48)      (-0.38)  
Market-to-Book -     -0.0009       -0.0009   
       (-0.37)      (-0.38)  
CEO Tenure +/-     -0.0004       -0.0004   
       (-0.92)      (-1.05)  
Firm Age -     -0.0024       -0.0023   
       (-1.69)      (-1.62)  
Deltat-1 +/-     -0.0755 **     -0.0511   
       (-2.09)      (-1.42)  
Vegat-1 +     0.0005 ***     0.0005 *** 
       (5.82)      (5.76)  
HT Dummy -     -0.0019       -0.0025   
       (-0.20)      (-0.27)  
Distress Dummy      0.0112 ***     0.0109 *** 
       (3.14)      (3.01)  
Observations      8049 
0.50 
    
8048 
0.50 R-Squared          
This table presents fixed effects regression models with the daily volatility of stock returns (Risk) for firm i for fiscal 
year t as the dependent variable for a sample of firm-year observations made over the period 1992-2006.  Analyst 
Dispersion is the negative of the standard deviation of analyst forecasts divided by the fiscal year end price. 
Accuracy is the negative of the ABS[(EPSfor—EPSact) / Price]. Delta is the dollar sensitivity of the option value with 
respect to a 1% change in stock price. Vega is the dollar sensitivity of the option value with respect to a 0.01 change 
in stock volatility. HT Dummy is a Dummy variable set to one for firms in high tech industries as identified by Kwon 
(2002) and zero otherwise. Control variables are described in Appendix B. The t-values are in parentheses and 
reflect standard errors that are heteroskedasticity robust and corrected for the cluster sample problem arising from 
multiple observation for each firm.  Subscripts (excluding those indicating lags) have been dropped in the table 
above for ease of presentation.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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TABLE 6 
2SLS Regressions of Risk on Analyst Dispersion and Accuracy with the Interaction of Compensation and Human 
Capital costs  
 
Variable Predicted Sign 
    
          Risk 
    
       Risk 
  
    
  
    
  
Constant  
    
0.0406 *** 
    
0.2103 *** 
   
    
(3.69)  
    
(3.50)  
Year Dummies  
    
Yes  
    
Yes  
   
    
  
    
  
Analyst Dispersion +/- 
    
-17.6172 ** 
    
  
  
    
(-2.5)  
    
  
Analyst 
Dispersion*Deltat-1 + 
    
23.5483 * 
    
  
  
    
(1.85)  
    
  
Analyst Dispersion*HT 
Dummy - 
    
-0.1226   
    
  
   
    
(-0.84)  
    
  
Accuracy +/-           -4.0324 *** 
             (-2.77)  
Accuracy*Deltat-1 + 
    
  
    
5.0725 ** 
  
    
  
    
(2.26)  
Accuracy*HT Dummy - 
    
  
    
-2.4453   
  
    
  
    
(-0.84)  
Size - 
    
-0.0206 ** 
    
-0.0171 * 
   
    
(-2.49)  
    
(-1.95)  
Book Leverage + 
    
-0.0316   
    
-0.0168   
   
    
(-1.24)  
    
(-0.69)  
Market-to-Book - 
    
0.0037   
    
0.0019   
   
    
(1.51)  
    
(0.93)  
CEO Tenure +/- 
    
-0.0004   
    
0.0019   
   
    
(-1.02)  
    
(0.93)  
Firm Age - 
    
0.0049   
    
-0.0003   
   
    
(0.49)  
    
(-0.81)  
Deltat-1 +/- 
    
0.0151   
    
-0.0003   
   
    
(0.43)  
    
(-0.81)  
Vegat-1 + 
    
0.0004 ** 
    
0.0077   
   
    
(2.38)  
    
(0.77)  
HT Dummy - 
    
0.0211 * 
    
0.0085   
   
    
(1.96)  
    
(0.29)  
Distress Dummy + 
    
0.0092 ** 
    
0.0005 *** 
   
    
(1.98)  
    
(6.82)  
Observations      9213      9212  
R-Squared      0.51      0.50  
                          Continued… 
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Table 6 (Continued) 
Tests for Relevance and Validity of Instruments 
F-Stat Analyst Dispersion     24.83 ***       
F-Stat Analyst Dispersion*Deltat-1     22.58 ***       
F-Stat Analyst Dispersion*HT Dummy     12.78 ***       
F-Stat Accuracy           17.11 *** 
F-Stat Accuracy*Deltat-1           18.25 *** 
F-Stat Accuracy*HT Dummy           30.80 *** 
Anderson-Rubin      6.96 ***     6.9000 *** 
       (0.0000)      (0.0000)  
Hansen J      4.48       0.29   
       (0.11)      (0.86)  
Instruments Used:  
    
Earnings Dummy 
  
Earnings Dummy 
      Industry Dispersion   Industry Accuracy 
  
    Industry 
Dispersion*Deltat-1 
  
Industry Accuracy*Deltat-1 
  
    Earnings 
Dummy*Deltat-1 
  Earnings Dummy*HT 
Dummy 
  
    Industry 
Dispersion*HT 
Dummy 
  
Industry Accuracy*HT 
Dummy 
This table presents fixed effects regression models with the daily volatility of stock returns (Risk) for firm i for fiscal year t 
as the dependent variable for a sample of firm-year observations made over the period 1992-2006.  Analyst Dispersion is 
the negative of the standard deviation of analyst forecasts divided by the fiscal year end price. Accuracy is the negative of 
the ABS[(EPSfor—EPSact) / Price]. Delta is the dollar sensitivity of the option value with respect to a 1% change in stock 
price. Vega is the dollar sensitivity of the option value with respect to a 0.01 change in stock volatility. HT Dummy is a 
Dummy variable set to one for firms in high tech industries as identified by Kwon (2002) and zero otherwise. Control and 
instrument variables are described in Appendix B. The t-values are in parentheses and reflect standard errors that are 
heteroskedasticity robust and corrected for the cluster sample problem arising from multiple observation for each firm.  
Subscripts (excluding those indicating lags) have been dropped in the table above for ease of presentation.   ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 7 
OLS Regressions of Risk on the Natural Log of the S&P Transparency and Disclosure Score with and 
without the Interaction of Compensation and Human Capital Costs for 2002 
 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign 
    
        Risk 
    
       Risk 
              
Constant  
    
0.5554 *** 
    
-1.6161 *** 
       (14.5)      (-3.90)  
Year Dummies      No      No  
               
Ln(TD)t-1 +/- 
    -0.0696 ***     0.9225   
       (-4.66)      (1.04)  
Ln(TD)t-1*Deltat-1 + 
          -1.7353   
             (-1.24)  
Ln(TD)t-1*HT Dummy - 
          -0.4901   
            (-0.93)  
Size -     -0.0287 ***     -0.0207 * 
       (-12.56)      (-1.91)  
Book Leverage +     0.0390 ***     0.1261 * 
       (2.79)      (1.81)  
Market-to-Book -     -0.0046 ***     -0.0176 ** 
       (-3.22)      (-2.06)  
CEO Tenure +/-     -0.0003       -0.0014   
       (-0.94)      (-0.92)  
Firm Age -     -0.0022 ***     -0.0028 *** 
   
    
(-9.05)  
    
(-3.47)  
Deltat-1 - 
    -0.2122 ***     -4.2967   
       (-8.3)      (-1.52)  
 Vegat-1 + 
    0.0004 ***     0.0015 *** 
       (7.54)      (5.24)  
HT Dummy + 
    
-0.0075   
    
1.0042   
       (-0.64)      (0.92)  
Distress Dummy +     0.0490 **     0.0516 *** 
      (2.56)      (2.72)  
Observations      416      416  
R-Squared  
    
0.44  
    
0.44  
This table presents fixed effects regression models with the daily volatility of stock returns (Risk) for firm i for fiscal 
year t as the dependent variable for a sample of firm-year observations made for 2002.  Analyst Dispersion is the 
negative of the standard deviation of analyst forecasts divided by the fiscal year end price. Accuracy is the negative of 
the ABS[(EPSfor—EPSact) / Price]. Delta is the dollar sensitivity of the option value with respect to a 1% change in 
stock price. Vega is the dollar sensitivity of the option value with respect to a 0.01 change in stock volatility. HT 
Dummy is a Dummy variable set to one for firms in high tech industries as identified by Kwon (2002) and zero 
otherwise. Control variables are described in Appendix B. The t-values are in parentheses and reflect standard errors 
that are heteroskedasticity robust and corrected for the cluster sample problem arising from multiple observation for 
each firm.  Subscripts (excluding those indicating lags) have been dropped in the table above for ease of presentation.    
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 8 
2SLS Regressions of Risk on the Natural Log of the S&P Transparency and Disclosure Score with and without 
the Interaction of Compensation and Human Capital Costs for 2001 
 
Variable Predicted Sign               Risk           Risk 
              
Constant      5.6037 ***     -20.2881   
       (2.87)      (-1.56)  
Year Dummies      No      No  
               
Ln(TD) +/-     -2.6538 ***     10.2155   
       (-2.64)      (1.58)  
Ln(TD)*Deltat-1 +           -19.9864 * 
             (-1.81)  
Ln(TD)*HT Dummy -           -0.0838   
            (-1.08)  
Size -     -0.0228       -0.0201   
       (-1.29)      (-0.94)  
Book Leverage +     0.1459       0.0884   
       (0.94)      (0.42)  
Market-to-Book -     -0.0010       0.0043   
       (-0.07)      (0.2)  
CEO Tenure +/-     -0.0014       -0.0046   
       (-0.55)      (-1.03)  
Firm Age -     0.0003       -0.0004   
       (0.17)      (-0.23)  
Deltat-1 -     -0.7257 ***     -40.8919 * 
       (-3.38)      (-1.84)  
Vegat-1 +     0.0012 **     0.0011 * 
       (2.59)      (1.74)  
HT Dummy +     -0.0874       -0.0195   
       (-1.52)      (-0.25)  
Distress Dummy +     0.0404       0.0676   
       (1.21)      (1.55)  
Observations      416      416  
R-Squared      -0.2434      -0.8024  
Tests for Relevance and Validity of Instruments 
F-Stat Ln(TD)     9.88 ***     20.19 *** 
F-Stat Ln(TD)*Deltat-1           20.52 *** 
F-Stat Ln(TD)*HT Dummy           34.75 *** 
Anderson-Rubin      23.83 ***     35.66 *** 
       (0.0000)      (0.0000)  
Hansen J      1.49       0.35  
       (0.2225)      (0.5535)  
Instruments Used:      Industry Accuracy   Industry Accuracy 
        Earnings Dummy    Earnings Dummy 
          Industry Accuracy*Deltat-1 
  
    
 
   Industry Accuracy*HT 
Dummy 
This table presents fixed effects regression models with the daily volatility of stock returns (Risk) for firm i for fiscal year t 
as the dependent variable for a sample of firm-year observations in 2001.  Analyst Dispersion is the negative of the standard 
deviation of analyst forecasts divided by the fiscal year end price. Accuracy is the negative of the ABS[(EPSfor—EPSact) / 
Price]. Delta is the dollar sensitivity of the option value with respect to a 1% change in stock price. Vega is the dollar 
sensitivity of the option value with respect to a 0.01 change in stock volatility. HT Dummy is a Dummy variable set to one 
for firms in high tech industries as identified by Kwon (2002) and zero otherwise. Control and instrument variables are 
described in Appendix B. The t-values are in parentheses and reflect standard errors that are heteroskedasticity robust and 
corrected for the cluster sample problem arising from multiple observation for each firm.  Subscripts (excluding those 
indicating lags) have been dropped in the table above for ease of presentation.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 9 
OLS Regressions of Risk on the Natural Log of the Predicted S&P Transparency and Disclosure Score with 
and without the Interaction of Compensation and Human Capital Costs 
 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign 
    
Risk 
    
Risk 
  
    
  
    
  
Constant  
    
0.5554 *** 
    
0.8605 *** 
   
    
(14.5)  
    
(4.3)  
Year Dummies  
    
Yes  
    
Yes  
   
    
  
    
  
Ln(Predicted TD)t-1 +/- 
    
-0.0696 *** 
    
-0.2428 ** 
   
    
(-4.66)  
    
(-2.45)  
Ln(Predicted TD)t-1* 
Deltat-1 + 
    
  
    
0.2879 ** 
   
    
  
    
(2.15)  
Ln(Predicted TD)t-1*HT 
Dummy - 
    
  
    
0.0809 ** 
  
    
  
    
(2.16)  
Size - 
    
-0.0287 *** 
    
-0.0082   
   
    
(-12.56)  
    
(-1.06)  
Book Leverage + 
    
0.0390 *** 
    
0.0080   
   
    
(2.79)  
    
(0.41)  
Market-to-Book - 
    
-0.0046 *** 
    
-0.0042 *** 
   
    
(-3.22)  
    
(-2.7)  
CEO Tenure +/- 
    
-0.0003   
    
-0.0002   
   
    
(-0.94)  
    
(-0.52)  
Firm Age - 
    
-0.0022 *** 
    
-0.0029 *** 
   
    
(-9.05)  
    
(-2.61)  
Deltat-1 +/- 
    
-0.2122 *** 
    
0.5883 ** 
   
    
(-8.3)  
    
(2.18)  
Vegat-1 + 
    
0.0004 *** 
    
0.0004 *** 
   
    
(7.54)  
    
(5.31)  
HT Dummy + 
    
-0.0075   
    
0.0059   
   
    
(-0.64)  
    
(0.71)  
Distress Dummy +     0.0196 ***     0.0211 *** 
      (6.16)      (3.29)  
Observations  
    
8048  
    
8048  
R-Squared  
    
0.49  
    
0.49  
This table presents fixed effects regression models with the daily volatility of stock returns (Risk) for firm i for fiscal 
year t as the dependent variable for a sample of firm-year observations made over the period 1992-2006.  Analyst 
Dispersion is the negative of the standard deviation of analyst forecasts divided by the fiscal year end price. Accuracy is 
the negative of the ABS[(EPSfor—EPSact) / Price]. Delta is the dollar sensitivity of the option value with respect to a 1% 
change in stock price. Vega is the dollar sensitivity of the option value with respect to a 0.01 change in stock volatility. 
HT Dummy is a Dummy variable set to one for firms in high tech industries as identified by Kwon (2002) and zero 
otherwise. Control variables are described in Appendix B. The t-values are in parentheses and reflect standard errors 
that are heteroskedasticity robust and corrected for the cluster sample problem arising from multiple observation for 
each firm.  Additionally, the standard errors were bootstrapped using 100 iterations.  Subscripts (excluding those 
indicating lags) have been dropped in the table above for ease of presentation.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 10 
2SLS Regressions of Risk on the Natural Log of the Predicted S&P Transparency and Disclosure Score with 
and without the Interaction of Compensation and Human Capital Costs 
 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign 
    
        Risk 
    
    Risk 
              
Constant      0.2045 ***     0.1014 *** 
       (4.92)      (3.23)  
Year Dummies      Yes      Yes  
               
Ln(Predicted TD) +/-     -0.2244 **     -0.0726   
       (-2.36)      (-0.57)  
Ln(Predicted TD)*Deltat-1 +           0.8598   
             (1.08)  
Ln(Predicted TD)*HT 
Dummy - 
    
  
    
-2.8341   
            (-1.09)  
Size -     -0.0123       0.0055   
       (-1.54)      (0.21)  
Book Leverage +     0.0025       0.0105   
       (0.11)      (0.29)  
Market-to-Book -     -0.0024       0.0030   
       (-1.15)      (0.66)  
CEO Tenure +/-     -0.0004       -0.0008   
       (-1.1)      (-1.2)  
Firm Age -     0.0045       0.0245   
       (0.47)      (1.23)  
Deltat-1 +/-     -0.0031       -1.7620   
       (-0.11)      (-1.08)  
Vegat-1 +     0.0006 ***     0.0007 *** 
       (7.43)      (3.6)  
HT Dummy +     0.0154       0.0312   
       (1.46)      (1.49)  
Distress Dummy +     0.0174 ***     0.0262 *** 
       (5.59)      (3.05)  
Observations      9733      9212  
R-Squared      0.41      0.41  
Tests for Relevance and Validity of Instruments 
F-Stat Ln(Predicted TD)     11.45 ***     13.26 *** 
F-Stat Ln(Predicted TD)*Deltat-1           46.27 *** 
F-Stat Ln(Predicted TD)*HT Dummy           12.99 ** 
Anderson-Rubin      3.45 **     3.67 *** 
       (0.0321)      (0.0056)  
Sargan statistic      55.345 ***     1.665  
      (0.0000)      (0.1970)  
Hansen J      0.16       0.02   
       (0.6858)      (0.8974)  
Instruments Used:      Industry Accuracy   Industry Accuracy 
      Earnings Dummy    Earnings Dummy 
          Industry Accuracy*Deltat-1 
               Industry Accuracy*HT Dummy 
This table presents fixed effects regression models with the daily volatility of stock returns (Risk) for firm i for fiscal year t 
as the dependent variable for a sample of firm-year observations made over the period 1992-2006.  Analyst Dispersion is 
the negative of the standard deviation of analyst forecasts divided by the fiscal year end price. Accuracy is the negative of 
the ABS[(EPSfor—EPSact) / Price]. Delta is the dollar sensitivity of the option value with respect to a 1% change in stock 
price. Vega is the dollar sensitivity of the option value with respect to a 0.01 change in stock volatility. HT Dummy is a 
Dummy variable set to one for firms in high tech industries as identified by Kwon (2002) and zero otherwise. Control and 
instrument variables are described in Appendix B. The t-values are in parentheses and reflect standard errors that are 
heteroskedasticity robust and corrected for the cluster sample problem arising from multiple observation for each firm.  
Additionally, the standard errors were bootstrapped using 100 iterations.  Subscripts (excluding those indicating lags) have 
been dropped in the table above for ease of presentation.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. 
